Early 2002 , after all we learned from the IEDs Identification Problem the last few years,  we start design KYKLOTRON TECH for the 2004 OLYMPIC GAMES at Athens .

The only thought we have in mind was this:

 

  '..We must develop a technology and a system which could  'give an efficient time to  security forces to act and eliminate the threat (explosives)'.'

   Kyklotron ltd CEO

 

This was - and even now is - our primary requirement for our systems.

 

In Kyklotorn ltd we believe that 'KYKLOTRON TECH'  is the only known tech -at this moment - that could provide PROTECTION FROM EXPLOSIVES to a LARGE AREA OVER 10000 meters diameter.

 

There are many other fine systems that are very accurate and prestigious in order to detect explosives from short and very short distances, but there is no ability to undertake PROTECTION FROM EXPLOSIVES MISSIONS, as those missions demands an efficient time giving to security forces to act and eliminate the threat (explosives).

 

But why we must detect explosives from very long distance  ? 

Because now days  are  the 'ISIS days' ...

 

This is an unbelievable threat but  is in front of us...

 

ANALYSIS

 

A. The threat

B. The 'requirements setting' problem

C. Common explosives detectors problems

     1.  For Metal & X-RAYS detectors 

    2. Short distance detectors

D. 'what we learned from the IEDs Identification Problem the last few years' a presentation

E. KYKLOTRON TECH : 'A SOLUTION TO THE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION PROBLEM'

 

 

A. The THREAT

A terrorist usually carries 10 KG (20 lbs) of explosives (Pipe bombs ,TNT rods, C4 etc)

Usually carries them on a Suicide vest .

         

At the above picture there is an icon of a kilo Pipe bomb (2 lbs)  

A terrorist usually carries a Suicide vest containing  10 Kilos  ( 20 Lbs) of explosives

A mobile moving terrorist usually carries 100 KG (200 lbs) of explosives (Pipe bombs ,TNT rods, C4 etc) inside the vehicle.

But if he uses a small truck a mobile moving terrorist could transport over a 4000 KG (8000 lbs) of explosives (Pipe bombs ,TNT rods, C4 etc) inside the truck or a VAN.

 

B.  The 'requirements setting' problem

 

Until now world wide commercial and military explosives detection systems detect explosives up to appx. 90 m range, when the STANDARD military minimum safety distance for the minimum quantity of explosives (1/2 pound of TNT) is 300 m (NATO standard) :

  • ·Dangerous to use explosives detection systems from short distances < 300 meters

  • · Impossible until today to prevent terrorists or saboteurs to reach their targets without being detected.

   

B. Common explosives detectors

    problems

 

 

   1.  As some : for Metals and X-RAYS explosives DETECTORS are

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PROBLEM 1 :  

 

   Those detectors when placed at travel stations :

 

Gathering  people and giving the ideal target

to every terrorist that he has already decide to die.  

 

bomb rocks Russian railway station of Volgograd 29 Dec 2013

 

At the same time  the terrorist achieves  his goal which is to:

  • devalues the security system  and

  • kill people
     

 

moment of explosion at Volgograd railway station in Russia 29 Dec 2013

 

See Video (3gp):bomb rocks Russian railway station of Volgograd 29 Dec 2013

 

PROBLEM 2 :  

 

 

Hacked X-Rays Could Slip Guns Past Airport Security

By Kim Zetter  02.11.14 

 
PUNTA CANA, Dominican Republic — Could a threat-simulation feature found in airport x-ray machines around the country

be subverted to mask weapons or other contraband hidden in a traveler’s carry-on?

 

 

The answer is yes, according to two security researchers with a history of discovering flaws in critical systems, who purchased

their own x-ray control machine online and spent months analyzing its inner workings.

The researchers, Billy Rios and Terry McCorkle, say the so-called Threat Image Projection function could someday backfire.
The feature is designed to train x-ray operators, and to periodically test their proficiency at spotting banned items. It allows

supervisors to superimpose a chosen image of contraband onto the screen of any baggage system in the airport. That same

 capability would allow someone with access to the airport supervisor’s workstation to superimpose a harmless image of socks

or underwear over an x-ray scan that would otherwise reveal a weapon or explosive.

 

 

“Someone could basically own this machine and modify the images that the operators see,” says Rios, who along with McCorkle

works for the security firm Qualys.

Threat Image Projection, or TIP, is present in all TSA-approved scanners, regardless of vendor. For their research, the Qualys

team examined software for the Rapiscan 522B.

 

 

http://www.wired.com/2014/02/tsa-airport-scanners

 

 

While agents ogle naked bodies, “lame bugs” allow evildoers to easily bypass machines

Steve Watson, Prisonplanet.com  February 13, 2014
New revelations from security researchers outline how much of the technology operated in airports by the TSA is fundamentally

flawed and can be fairly easily bypassed by anyone with the intention of getting dangerous items through security lines.

Experts working at security firm Qualys, have discovered that both body and baggage scanners can be hacked in order to present

false images that could fool TSA screeners into giving a person or baggage the all clear, when in fact weapons or explosives are

present.

So while everyday Americans are being zapped with radiation and having their naked images recorded (yes the machines

 still produce naked images), it is entirely possible for terrorists with a little technical know-how to skip right through the TSA’s

lines of defense.

Experts Billy Rios and Terry McCorkle note that the vulnerability exists in Rapiscan scanners, which have a Threat Image Projection

(TIP) function, designed to train and test TSA screeners by superimposing fake images. They also found that passwords were not

needed in order to access this function within the machines.

According to the two experts, the training software is also present in machines deployed in government buildings, embassies,

courthouses, ports and border crossings.

“Someone could basically own this machine and modify the images that the operators see,” Rios, a director of threat intelligence,

told Wired.

The report notes that “the supervisor’s password screen could be subverted through a simple SQL injection attack — a common

hacker tactic that involves entering a special string of characters to trigger a system into doing something it shouldn’t do. In this

case, the string would allow an attacker to bypass the login to gain access to a console screen that controls the TIP feature.”

“Just throw [these] characters into the login,” Rios said, and the system accepts it. “It tells you there’s an error, [but then] just

logs you in.”

“It’s so outrageous that they didn’t [encrypt]. If anyone ever gets access to the [Rapiscan] file system, they will have access to

 all the user accounts and passwords in clear text,” he told Wired. “No need for keyloggers or malware, just read them out

of the text files.”

“These bugs are actually embarrassing. It was embarrassing to report them to DHS — the ability to bypass the login screen.

These are really lame bugs.” Rios added.

Critics will argue that this once again highlights how the TSA’s operations are pure security theater that actually does very little

to ensure the safety of Americans, while guzzling billions in taxpayer funding.

Rapiscan has denied that the machines have any vulnerability, suggesting instead that Rios and McCorkle used “misconfigured

equipment” during their research. The TSA also denied that the scanners were hackable.

“The Rapiscan version that is utilized by TSA is not available for sale commercially or to any other entity; the commercial version

 of the TIP software is not used by TSA,” TSA spokesman Ross Feinstein told Wired.

Then again, why should anyone in their right minds believe anything Rapiscan or the TSA claims. The two have been caught in

lies and deliberate misinformation regarding the scanners on multiple occasions.

Last year, the TSA came under strict scrutiny from Congress over the mothballing of $14 million worth of body scanners. All in all,

the 250 backscatter scanners the agency now has are worth a combined total of $40 million.

The real reason some of the machines were removed from airports is because of allegations that the manufacturer Rapiscan

manipulated operational tests on the machines, and the company was never able to develop the “stick man” software that masks

 naked images produced by the scanners.

In addition, further documents obtained by EPIC show how the TSA “publicly mischaracterized” findings of the National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST), in stating that the agency had positively confirmed the safety of full body scanners in tests.

It has also been proven that the scanner can be fooled by sewing a metallic object into the side of one’s clothing, rendering the

 entire fleet of machines virtually useless.

A recently discovered Homeland Security report also noted that federal investigators have “identified vulnerabilities in the

screening process” involving the scanners.

Multiple other security experts have gone on record saying that the scanners are ineffective, yet the TSA is now seeking

a whole new generation of more powerful, and many would argue more intrusive, scanners seemingly based on the same

technology.

Another security experts, Bruce Schneier, CTO of Co3 Systems. also chimed in on the latest revelations of security flaws:
“This reminded me a lot of voting machines. When you design these government systems under procurement rules, you end

up using old stuff. No one is paying attention to updating it, so security is crap because no one is analyzing it.”

“Stuff done in secret gets really shoddy security … We know what gives us security is the constant interplay between the research

community and vendors.” Schneier added.

 

 

 

2. Short distance detectors 

 

As some : Trace detectors, LASER detectors, Electroscopes,

Paramagnetism tech detectors,

Using Human Bioenergy detectors, CANIN detectors  are  

 

 

 

Lets look at a REAL WORLD EXAMPLE :  A 'high security' hotel in Middle East (Lebanon)

 

PROBLEM 1 :

 

 Look at the Guard (security man) acts the same every time a car passes thru inside hotel area.

lHe walk with the short distance device on his hand in the opposite direction of the moving car...

 

 

This is because those detectors dont use a system (machine) to produce a magnetic field,  but other techniques...

 

See Video (3gp):HIGH SECURITY HOTEL 1

 

See Video (3gp):HIGH SECURITY HOTEL 2

 

See Video (3gp):HIGH SECURITY HOTEL 3

 

 What is going on here ?

 

 

  • The car has already be in front of the Hotels gate.  Guard has no time to react

     

    If the car carries explosives, then the driver has just to drive the car inside the hotel and blast the explosives.  

     

     

    PROBLEM 2 :  

     

    TERRORIST COULD BLAST THE EXPLOSIVES

    EVEN FROM THE ROAD OUT OF THE HOTEL...

     

    International experience from the Marriott Incident

     

    The first step in defeating the evolving terrorist threat, is acknowledging that even the most robust counter  measures may not prevent an attack.

     

    Notwithstanding these measures, 56 people died and 270 were injured when a suicide bomber detonated his charge after his vehicle slammed into the Delta Barrier. The blast from the powerful 1,320 pound bomb created a 25 foot deep by 60 foot wide crater in front of the hotel, destroyed most of the upper floor rooms of the property, and ignited a blaze that burned for two days.

     

    Had the bomber achieved his goal of ramming the explosives-laden truck into the hotel lobby, the casualty count may have topped one thousand.

     

    All the above technologies seems to have  the same disadvantage : 

    Working according the NATO  requirements ( detect explosives up to appx. 90 m range, not over 300 meters)

     

    This fact mace those systems :

     

    • ·Dangerous to use explosives detection systems from short distances < 300 meters

    • · Impossible until today to prevent terrorists or saboteurs to reach their targets without being detected.

     

     

    D. 'what we learned from the IEDs Identification

             Problem the last few years'

     

     

     

     

     

    What have we learned from the IEDs Identification Problem 

     the last few years ?

     

    In order to protect an area : 

     

    An Early Warning System is needed for long distance Detection-Localization-  Monitoring & Digital Recording, in a GIS database, for materials such as: Explosives, IED's and Ammunition of any kind.

     

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

At the incident site

 

 

 

·Important    factors:

 

-portability, sensitivity, accuracy, ease of use,

single or multi categories of explosives, not controlled environment, scan method

 

·Typical   Detection   Technologies:

 

-Trace detection

-X-ray (widely used)

-Canine detection (short-distance)

-Novel & Experimental technologies

 

Kyklotron Technology:

 

 

 

 

E.  KYKLOTRON TECH : 'A SOLUTION TO

THE EXPLOSIVES DETECTION PROBLEM'

 

... A system that could detect explosives from a long distance *, to accurately locate them and digitally capture their exact positioning in a common geographical database.

 

This enables sufficient reaction time and gives the operational advantage (adequate time) tο eliminate the threat, before it reaches valuable assets.

 

                                                                                                 Kyklotron CEO

*   sometimes  over  a  few  Kilometers  away

 

 

 

Explosives  Detection

 

A  Solution   to the problem

 

An   Early Warning System 

 

      +

 

       Long Range detection SENSOR (S)

       

         =    

a    C4ISR* system

 

 

 

  • ·DRAMS (Detection and Recording Automatically, by Magnetic tuned Systems) Early Warning System (EWS) is ideally designed for 24 hour surveillance missions as well as to clear wide areas (locate materials) from explosives and ammunitions.(www.kyklotron.com).

  •  

  • ·'KYKLOTRON' TB and TB sensor surveillance-detection technology in conjunction with a full command and control system using computers and communications (C4ISR) make it possible, in having a reliable solution to this serious world wide problem.

  •  

  • ·The DRAMS EWS detection range is over 20 Kilometers (depending on the targets mass) and has been developed and distributed by Kyklotron ltd (www.kyklotron.com )

  •  

  • ·DRAMS EWS and 'KYKLOTRON' sensor surveillance-detection tech is worldwide patented, as systems and method, since 2004 (4 patents)

  •  

  • ·The military operational capability and effectiveness of the system have been recognized by the Hellenic General Staff of National Defense.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

KYKLOTRON TB/S forms a Modulated EMF  that allows detection of all types of explosives, weapons and ammunitions within a distance between 0 and 20000 meters behind and through all types of obstacles (including concrete, steel etc.).

 

· Magnetic fields are not affected from any given barrier, which means that KYKLOTRON TB/S can detect explosives hidden behind concrete walls, metal cases etc. and is especially useful in covert scenarios.

 

·The detection of explosives is achieved with the cross bearing method (Antenna used as a pointer), showing the direction of interference.

 

 

 

 

 

DRAMS is an operational (strategic or tactical) system  (using two or more users mobile, immobile or combination, shown as yellow and blue humans on the next picture) detecting and electronically recording on a computer the precise specific localisation of distinguishable explosives from long distance (over 20.000 metres). The exact point (shown as a blue circle on the next picture) of located explosives  on the ground or surface of sea, in real time recorded in a digital geographic background (GIS) data base, on KYKLOTRON E3 screen (shown as the cross of the two green lines on the next picture).